INTRODUCTION
In Angove's Pty Ltd v Bailey, 1 the Supreme Court was presented with two questions of principle:
whether an agent's authority could ever be 'irrevocable', and whether the receipt of money by an imminent insolvent could ever give rise to a constructive trust of that sum.
In the first instance, this note will lay out the facts of the case and detail the decisions that the court made. It will then examine and critique the court's reasoning. Ultimately, it will argue that while that reasoning was far from perfect, the law has been settled in a way which is largely consistent with legal theory. Having said that, this note will also take the view that, while the Supreme Court's conclusion Indeed, Angove's purported termination of the ADA was designed to prevent just that from happening. He also said he could not see a meaningful distinction between the situation where money was received 'by an agent who becomes insolvent before accounting for it' and where 'a contractor [provides] goods or services on credit' and the recipient becomes insolvent before paying. 23 This appears to have inclined him against finding that the money had come into the wrong hands. For the purposes of insolvency law, the two situations could then be treated the same.
LORD SUMPTION'S REASONING

On the inherency of revocability
To establish the inherency of all authority's revocability, His Of course, in the usual course of events, the fact that a principal can empower an agent is beneficial to them. They can do more business than they would otherwise be able to do. However, consistently with the terms of their power, an agent might change their principal's position in a way in which is not in their best interests. In such a case, unless they can revoke their agent's authority, there is nothing a principal can do to stop this.
Thus, we can understand Lord Sumption's third point: that authority's inherent revocability follows from the same concern that animates Equity's refusal to specifically enforce contractual agency relationships. It would simply be too great an interference with a principal's personal autonomy if they
were not allowed to prevent themselves from being liable to another's exercise of a power to change their legal relations. The revocation of an agent's contractually granted 'irrevocable' authority may give rise to a claim for damages, 33 but that threat is not comparable to the hardship which a principal could suffer if they could not curtail their liability at all.
On the relevant 'exception' to that rule
Lord Sumption's explanation of the 'relevant interest' 'exception' to the principle of revocability is also problematic. His Lordship purported to explain the existence of that 'exception' by reference to the idea that, in some cases, an agent could owe his principal a duty of divided loyalty. 34 He said that, if the logic of the rule against 'irrevocability' was premised on the idea that an agent owes his principal a duty of However, to say this is to confuse the nature of an agent's relationship with his principal qua powerholder and the nature of an agent's relationship with his principal qua fiduciary. It is also to interpret a situation outside the scope of the principle of revocability as an exception to it.
As has been said, an agent's authority is inherently revocable because of the severity of the potential abuse that the very existence of such a power-liability relationship as gives it substance entails. Thus, subject to the caveat that all agents are necessarily fiduciaries, rather than looking at the scope of an agent's fiduciary duty, His Lordship's concern should have been with the permitted scope of their powers as agents. What he should have said was that, in principle, those powers can take a number of different forms, so long as they would not necessarily render the agent unable to be subject to a fiduciary duty.
Indeed, it is for this reason that His Lordship's observation that the so-called personal interest 'exception' does not apply where an agent's only interest in the exercise of his power is in 'being able to earn his commission', 36 is correct. It is standard Equitable doctrine that, so long as they are authorised, fiduciaries are entitled to make profits from the discharge of their roles. This means that, in a situation such as that which Lord Sumption described as constituting an 'exception' to the rule on revocability, what is really going on is, by definition, not true agency. Because all true agents are fiduciaries, where two parties' respective powers and liabilities are such that the power-holder does not need to act loyally in the sense that a fiduciary has to, he simply cannot be an agent.
The better view is that where one party has granted another authority to sell a certain piece of land, in order that the proceeds can be used to satisfy a debt he owes the grantee, 39 any agency relationship which might be thought to exist is merely 'a device' for the satisfaction of the debt. 40 It is 'no more than the commercial equivalent of an assignment'.
41
Lord Sumption disputed this by reference to a hypothetical case where an agent makes advances out of his own pocket, on behalf of his principal, in the course of trying to sell their goods. He thought that if those advances were made against the proceeds of the sale, and if the resultant debt was agreed to be secured against the agent's authority to make that sale, then there would be 'no principled reason' why the agent's authority would not be 'irrevocable', even though he was still a true agent. 42 However, with respect and for reasons already given, this cannot be correct. Either an agent's principal is entitled to his undivided loyalty or else there is no agency in play at all. Without making a substantial concession to doctrinal coherence, there can be no compromise on this point. 
On whether the 'exception' applied
Here we can be brief. Lord Sumption's application of the law to the facts of Angove's is unimpeachable.
He noted that, because D & D was given express authority to collect prices from buyers, it would 'have been simple enough to provide in terms that it was irrevocable', but this was not done. 44 Likewise, there was nothing from which to infer that the authority was 'irrevocable'. Under the terms of the ADA, D & D's authority to collect prices would only have survived termination 'if it constituted an "accrued right or remedy" of the agent', 45 however, it was expressly described 'as a responsibility, not a right'. 
